This paper aims to address the issue that existing human life has moral priority over non-human life. Firstly, it will be necessary to deconstruct the question and attempt to define the notions of “existing human life”, “non-human life” and “moral priority”. Secondly, in considering the interconnectedness of all existence, establishing the role and nature of the environment is imperative. This will then lead to a discussion of anthropocentric, extensionist and biocentric approaches to environmental ethics. Moreover, the central argument of this paper will propose that although existing human life is empowered with moral decision over non-human life, human beings are neither superior nor advantaged in the holistic environment and regardless of the anthropocentrist and extensionist approaches, both will eventually concede to some form of biocentricism.
Existing human life may be simply described as living human beings. However, it might be more precise to assume that an important component of most humans is its capacity for rational thought and intellect, which is central to our evolution. Non-human life is precisely its opposite, although some may argue that some animals also possess rational thought, their intellect does not yet parallel the speed of intellectual development of humans. It is the combination of rational thought and intellect that has enabled humans to debate and act on ethical issues. Insofar as humans are capable of moral decision, it may be correct to assume that existing human life is empowered with moral decision over non-human life. However, the moral priority of existing human life implies that we have more rights than non-human life.
Nature, being apolitical, is not concerned with who has superior rights over who. However with science and technology, humans over the years have increasingly become the custodians of nature and the future of present existence is held in human hands. This empowers humans with a heavy burden of responsibility to manipulate the course of nature. The reverence and sanctity of nature is paramount to present humans because it is the platform on which we have evolved and unless artificial worlds become a plausible reality without any fear and scepticism whatsoever, respect and responsibility toward nature is most imperative. Moreover, humans are intrinsically connected to nature and whatever we decide will obviously affect us. Clearly if we destroy nature, we destroy humans too. Although we are endowed with ethical responsibility, it does not necessarily mean that we have any superiority over non-human life as the major religions might propose (Singer 1993:265-268). Humans are just as susceptible to nature as non-humans are.
Underlying all discussions of environmental ethics is the premise that human beings are required to act with moral responsibility for the natural world. There are three main approaches to environmental ethics: anthropocentric, extensionist and biocentric.
Firstly, an anthropocentric approach dictates the primacy and intrinsic value of the human being. The idea that only human beings have intrinsic value means that there is nothing that is required to prove its value. Environmental questions are therefore determined in terms of what is most fitting for human beings. It is inevitable that anthropocentrists, in assessing what is most fitting, are subject to difference of opinion. Where the primary focus is on humans, it obviously seems to be an egoistic endeavour and the result of which could involve different conclusions about what is most fitting. Consequently, such clashes might be resolved through utilitarianism.
A central imperative to the anthropocentric approach bases environmental obligations in justification to the rights, interests or well being of existing and future human beings. The utility or usefulness of the environment lies in the fact that we are inherent to the environment. Undoubtedly anthropocentrists will finally conclude that humans rely on the environment and non-humans for their own survival, and the neglect of which will determine the demise of the human being. Therefore moral considerations must be extended to non-humans if existing human life wishes to survive.
An extensionist approach does consider non-human life in moral decision-making. Extensionists introduce two terms to the environmental ethics debate: sentientism and speciesism (Preston 1996:ch.9). Sentientism is the theory that those beings capable of feeling or the senses should be the subject of moral concern. This is claimed to be a utilitarian view, the most prominent proponent of which is Peter Singer. Speciesism, alternatively, is a prejudice for one’s own species against other species. As a result, it is clear that there is, in the extensionist approach, a divergence in whether moral rights should be extended to all those with sentience or all beings that are alive.
This appeals to the human construct of rights: the rights of animals and the environment. As proposed before, nature is apolitical and is not concerned with who has rights over whom because all things are interconnected. Nevertheless, extentionists, like anthropocentrists, focus on the concept of individual entities. Indeed Singer (1993:282) questions the value of a single or individual plant suggesting that “no individual is necessary for the survival of the ecosystem as a whole”. Unfortunately if Singer sanctions that humans have moral priority over non-sentient existence then every person on this earth is morally justified to cut down one single tree. This certainly means deforestation if it was localised and would be deemed wrong or immoral. Even the human body is comprised of cells and if a single cell is damaged and not repaired or replaced, it can pose a threat, as in the case of cancer, to the whole body.
The individualistic nature of the extenstionist and anthropocentric view denies or ignores the interconnectedness of all existence. It is easiest to illustrate this interconnectedness by referring to the scientific concept of the food chain. This theory insists that there is a cycle of food consumption – for example on land, humans eat grazing animals whose grass is fertilised by decomposed animals, waste and so on. When something is taken out of the food chain through, for example, extinction, no matter how minuscule the existence, its loss will disrupt the whole food cycle. Whether the other forms of existence will evolve without it is another matter. Certainly, if human consumption continues at the present unnatural level, at one point or another humans will exhaust all non-renewable resources and irreversibly extinguish all renewable resources. Consequently, humans might turn to cannibalism and then exhaust other humans as well. This leads to a conclusion that the Darwinian “utopia” with the “survival of the fittest” is when all existence ceases to exist. Therefore, it might be redundant to write about human evolution. Indeed if the sun exhausts its hydrogen tomorrow, there will be no more humans or ecosystems to discuss. Without sounding too metaphysical, this implies that all existence is transient and the only viable solution for human survival in its very short timespan is environmental damage control.
Anthropocentrists and extentionists do not seem to view nature and existence in this way, focussing instead on what has most utility subsequently driving the level of human consumption higher. It is plainly obvious that, at a certain point in the development of these approaches, they would find that the real utility of preserving the environment is for the survival of the human species who are intrinsically bound by it.
Nature is amoral: it does not know right from wrong – it just evolves. Environmental ethics is only a problem for humans because we have been the most destructive and avaricious of all the animals in the short time that we have existed. Indeed, humans are empowered with moral decision-making in relation to the environment and are capable of acting on these decisions. Whether we choose the right path is another matter. Nevertheless nature will continue to evolve with or without human beings, for nature the latter would probably be preferable. Given this, human beings do not have moral priority over non-human existence – human beings are not the most important species in nature but are only equals interdependent with the rest of nature.
REFERENCES
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Preston, N (1996) Understanding Ethics, Sydney: Federation Press.
Singer, P (1993) Practical Ethics, NewYork: Cambridge University Press.
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Thiroux, J.P. (1990) Ethics: Theory and Practice – 4th Edition, New York: Macmillan.